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AF, ZL  
SUBJECT: (U) EUR A/S FRIED, S SEPTEMBER 25, 2007, MEETING  
WITH DUTCH POLITICAL DIRECTOR PIETER DE GOOIJER

Classified By: 1. (U) Classified by: EUR Assistant Secretary of State  
Daniel Fried, Department of State. Reason 1.4 (b and d)

[12.](#) (U) September 25 2007, 11:45 a.m., New York

[13.](#) (U) Participants:

United States  
A/S Dan Fried, EUR  
Elaine Samson, EUR(Notetaker)

Netherlands  
Political Director Pieter de Gooijer  
Dutch UN Mission Political Officer Jules Gerzon

[14.](#) (C) SUMMARY. Afghanistan and Kosovo dominated the meeting. The Dutch are committed to remaining in Afghanistan, but to obtain their coalition government's approval, there must be political, military, and financial solidarity and burdensharing among allies. On Kosovo, the Dutch expressed uncertainty that there is sufficient legal basis to continue KFOR if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). A/S Fried strongly disagreed and noted that lawyers from the Quint were developing a position that UNSCR 1244 remains in effect even if Kosovo makes a UDI. Fried explicitly warned that the United States would not replace forces if European nations pulled out of KFOR, and the Europeans will bear the blame for the baleful consequences of loss of international support for Kosovo if Kosovo falls apart.  
END SUMMARY.

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Afghanistan  
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[15.](#) (C) The Netherlands is very concerned that no substantial, concrete contributions to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) are forthcoming from other NATO member countries. De Gooijer reaffirmed that the Netherlands made a military commitment when it decided to send troops to Afghanistan, and to stay when NATO assumed command of ISAF, but it never intended to be responsible for finding replacements and additional resources to help in Afghanistan. Dutch internal decisionmaking by all the factions in the coalition government is prepared

to  
continue Dutch participation and support in Afghanistan, but  
only if there is political, military and financial solidarity  
and burdensharing with other allies. For the Christian  
Democrats  
to be able to justify their continued support, the Dutch  
participation has to be different from what they are doing  
now.  
Minister of Development Cooperation Bert Koenders is working  
to  
increase the development element of the Dutch mission.

¶16. (C) Nevertheless, the perception in the Netherlands is  
that  
it is doing more than other allies. The Dutch have  
identified  
several elements of their mission that other countries could  
take on, such as: battlegroup; protection of camps;  
Apaches and F-16s; PRTs; 2 OMLTs, and a hospital.  
Other countries need to make significant contributions to  
enable  
the Dutch government to generate enough support within the  
coalition to approve a continued presence. De Gooijer said  
that  
since February 2007 the Dutch have met with NATO SACEUR,  
the French, the Germans and others, and only the Slovaks have  
said they are considering sending 150-200 engineers.  
De Gooijer noted that he had talked to French FM Kouchner  
last week about providing two or three OMLTs, and Kouchner  
promised to promote it with the Defense Minister. De Gooijer  
asked A/S Fried to speak to NATO SACEUR and urge him to come  
up  
with more proposals for additional contingents.  
(Fried did so later that day.) The Dutch are even reaching  
out  
to non-NATO partners, and have approached Singapore to  
provide  
a hospital. The Netherlands was considering asking the  
Indonesians to provide a hospital, but the Australians  
didn't  
support that idea. Italy has not made any specific  
proposals,  
nor has Spain or Turkey.

¶17. (C) A/S Fried suggested approaching Georgia to increase  
their presence in Afghanistan, since they are decreasing their  
contingent in Iraq (and are asking for a Membership Action  
Plan  
(MAP) at the upcoming NATO summit in Bucharest.) De Gooijer  
was open to talking to the Georgians, but asked what they  
could  
do on the ground in Afghanistan? He noted that the actual  
capabilities of national contingents was very important,  
since  
they would be supporting each other and needed to be able to  
count on their abilities. Fried suggested that the Georgians  
might be capable of providing force protection. De Gooijer  
indicated the Dutch feel forced to consider what other  
alternatives there might be, including using the NATO  
Response  
Force (NRF), but that there was a lot of reluctance to use  
NRF.

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Kosovo  
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¶18. (C) De Gooijer commented that the GONL is concerned that  
if Kosovo makes a unilateral declaration of independence  
(UDI),  
there would not be a legal basis for a continued peacekeeping  
operation (PKO), or that if a Kosovo UDI was not recognized  
by a number of countries, there would not be a strong enough  
basis for a ESDP or NATO PKO. A/S Fried disagreed strongly,  
noting that U.S., UK, French, German and Italian lawyers have  
been consulting, and believe that even if Kosovo declares  
independence, UNSCR 1244 remains in effect. Fried explicitly  
told the Dutch that Kosovo is a European as well as a U.S.

problem, and that if European nations pulled out their troops after a UDI, the United States would not replace them and sustain KFOR. A European pull-out of KFOR or failure to support the ESDP Mission would have real consequences. People would die. After all the talk of European unity and ESDP, it would be unconscionable for Europe to let this problem in its own backyard fall apart.

19. (C) A/S Fried told the Dutch the U.S. has great confidence in Ischinger and Frank Wisner, and it may be possible to find some face-saving formula Serbia would accept. Fried advised De Gooijer that if nothing is resolved by December 10 when the current negotiating period ends, the Netherlands should be prepared to move forward. The ESDP mission should go ahead. KFOR will remain, and it is critical that KFOR's legitimacy not be questioned. The EU cannot allow a few members to prevent the EU from acting positively.

De Gooijer asked that the U.S. share its legal thinking with the skeptical EU members. If the legal reasoning for continuing KFOR and UNSCR 1244 was strong enough for other countries to accept, even if they did not completely agree with it, it would decrease the number of EU members who would not want to recognize an independent Kosovo to a manageable number. The building of an EU consensus might be able to keep them in line.  
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